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ABSTRACT 
FUKUDA, MITSUKI  A Closer look at Immigrants’ Wage Differential in the U.S.: 
Analysis Correcting the Sample Selection Problem 
 Department of Economics, June 2015 
 ADVISOR: Younghwan Song 
 
Due to the increasing flow of immigrants into the United States in recent years, 
numerous researchers have been examining the socioeconomic characteristics of 
immigrants including wage differential. However, the majority of such wage analysis 
raises a key issue of the sample selection problem. This problem occurs when one has a 
non-random sample by ignoring the decision process to be participants of the sample, and 
it has a potential danger of a biased and inconsistent estimation. In the view of this, it is 
important to estimate the decision factors of employment status – being a wage earner or 
self-employed – before the wage analysis. 
The regression analysis follows that of Lofstrom (2002). He estimates the 
earnings of wage earners and the self-employed by correcting selection bias using a 
method introduced by Heckman (1979). Using the data from the 2003 and 2013 
American Community Survey PUMS, my study aims to analyze the economic 
performance of immigrant wage workers by country of origin while correcting for sample 
bias and updating the findings of Lofstrom. The estimates find that immigrant enclave 
and earning differential variables have significant effects on the probability of being a 
wage earner. The negative sign of the correction term suggests negative selection into the 
wage/salary sector. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A. Historical Background1 
 The United States has been a popular destination for immigrants from all over 
the world for years. Increasing influx of immigrants into the United States has been one 
of the major concerns in the U.S. economic and political fields. After World War I, the 
number of immigrants started to grow significantly. Figure 1 displays the number of 
persons obtaining legal permanent residency from 1820 to 2010. The federal government 
enacted a national origins quota system in 1920, so as to restrict the entry of immigrants 
by setting restrictions per country and allowing a limited number of visas. This 
discriminative system essentially allowed immigrants almost only from Western 
countries. In 1965, the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments put an end to the 
quota system by loosening visa restriction by country. However, this system employed a 
so-called categorical preference system, which implies that the limits were not fully 
abolished. The policy placed the caps for immigration from most countries, but the 
immediate relatives of persons residing in the U.S. were allowed to enter the country with 
almost no exceptions. The Act was amended over the years by escalating the ceiling of 
the limits. This amendment and successive immigration policy reforms made the number 
of immigrants grow in a steady manner. After World War I, immigration peaked during 
the “Great Migration,” reached its lowest in the 1930s, and has steadily increased since, 
such that it is at the highest rate. The skyrocketing in the late 1980s is due to the 
                                                
1 This subsection is written based on the information available from Congressional Budget Office (2006) 
and Monger and Yankay (2014). 
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Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, which is meant to deal with the growing 
concerns of increasing numbers of illegal immigrants. As a part of the act, about 2.7 
million people who were residing in the U.S. illegally obtained legal resident status under 
its amnesty programs. 
 The demographic composition of immigrants’ national origin has changed over 
time as well. As suggested above, immigrants from non-Western countries such as those 
in Asia and Africa, and some countries in Europe were in fact not able to easily enter the 
U.S. after the Act of 1920. In the 1950s, two thirds of the immigrant population was from 
Europe and Canada, but in the 1990s, the numbers of immigrants from such countries 
declined significantly; Latin Americans made up almost half the population of 
immigrants, and Asians comprised 30 percent. The outstanding fact here is that the rate of 
Asian immigrants’ growth is significant – 6 percent to 30 percent from the 1950s to the 
1990s (Borjas, 1999, Figure1-2). National origin change and immigrants’ skills are 
closely related. Borjas (1985, 1994a) suggests that the relative skill of immigrants has 
been declining over the decades. Skill, interpreted as human capital, is often measured in 
years or level of education. His studies of immigrant cohorts in the 1970s, 1980s and 
1990s show that, over time, the level of education attained and skill sets of immigrants 
have decreased. 
 
B. Contribution and Organization of This Paper 
 Using the cross-sectional data from the 2003 and 2013 American Community 
Survey PUMS, this paper analyzes the wage earnings of immigrant wage earners 
correcting the sample selection problem. Following Heckman’s two-step model, a probit 
 3 
equation for being a wage earner is estimated before estimating the wage equation. The 
paper basically follows Lofstrom’s (2002) procedure. While he uses data from the 1980 
and 1990 Census of Population, this study updates his analysis while analyzing the wage 
model with the most recent data from the American Community Survey. It would be 
worthwhile to see the immigrants’ economic performance in recent years given the fact 
that the majority of studies regarding immigrants’ earnings are from before the 2000s. 
Moreover, this paper figures out the economic performance of immigrants from each 
origin country and the most recent immigrant cohorts. Most studies on immigrants’ 
wages or earnings often ignore the distinctive difference of skill or self-employment rates 
among original countries. Therefore, estimating by country of origin enables us to look 
closer at the wage differential among immigrants. 
 This paper finds that the number of immigrants from the same country and the 
relative success of self-employment workers in the state affect the probability of being a 
wage earner significantly. Additionally, when the self-employment rate of the 
co-nationals is high, the wage regression without the correction term is found to be 
inconsistently estimating the wages of immigrants. Negative selection into wage/salary 
sectors reveals a different picture from Lostrom (2002). 
The organization of this paper is as follows. Chapter Two reviews the existing 
literature regarding wage differential among immigrants in the U.S. and immigrants’ 
decision of employment status. Chapter Three provides the statistical methodology and 
econometric models used in this paper, including the probit model and the wage equation. 
Chapter Four presents the description of the data used to analyze the wages of immigrants 
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and natives. Chapter Five shows the results and analysis. Chapter Six concludes and 
summarizes the findings in the analysis. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE REGARDING IMMIGRANTS’ EARNINGS AND  
EMPLOYMENT STATUS 
This chapter first provides a review of the major existent literature on 
immigrants’ earnings and wages. Secondly, I review the studies concerning the 
immigrants’ decision of employment status. 
 
A. Economic Performance of Immigrants in the U.S. 
 A number of economists, sociologists, and governmental organizations have 
been vigorously conducting research on the socioeconomic situation of immigrants, as 
the ethnic diversity has appeared to be a more dominant characteristic in the demographic 
picture of the United States. Immigrants have different wages than natives because of 
their distinguishing characteristics, as observed in their paths to assimilation into the U.S. 
labor market, and the various forms of human capital that immigrants intrinsically have 
or acquire throughout their lives. Examples of human capital include education, language 
ability, and knowledge of the U.S. labor market. Such characteristics make each ethnic 
group of immigrants different from each other. Likewise, the relative wage of immigrants 
in comparison with native workers significantly varies across such groups or countries of 
origin. For example, Borjas (1994b, Table 8) shows that Austrian immigrants earn 38.4 
percent more than native-born citizens do, while Greek immigrants earn 0.9 percent less.  
 Immigrants’ assimilation into the labor market and arrival cohorts’ differences 
are the key components when their economic performance is debated. Borjas has written 
a number of the most well-known literature on immigrants in the U.S. labor market. 
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Borjas (1985, 1994a) questions Chiswick’s (1978) assumption that immigrants have 
relatively lower wages than natives in their arrival, but as they assimilate into the labor 
market and accumulate human capital more rapidly than native counterparts, the wages 
reach and even surpass that of native workers after a few decades. Borjas argues that this 
finding might be subject to the change in each cohort’s productivity. The cohort effect 
suggests that productivity of immigrants is different among arrival cohorts. The cohort 
effect takes place when an immigrant cohort’s productivity changes, economic conditions 
in the origin country change, or there are predominantly high skilled immigrants left in 
the host country because those who have relatively lower skills return to the origin 
country. Given the essential difference among the arrival cohorts, Borjas insists that a 
single cross-sectional analysis overestimates the wage growth; an accurate estimation of 
the assimilation effect is done by tracking specific cohorts over time, rather than 
capturing a single year. Borjas (1994b) uses 1970, 1980, and 1990 Census data, and finds 
that more recent immigrant cohorts have relatively lower wages than native workers even 
though the pace of decline is decreasing. He also finds that the 1970 arrival cohort is far 
from reaching parity of natives’ earnings. Most immigrant studies recognize this skill or 
“quality” decline of the recent immigrants (Butcher and Card, 1991; Lofstrom, 2002). 
However, Borjas (1999) and LaLonde and Topel (1992) suggest that much of such 
overall decline of relative skills of the recent immigrants can be attributed to the strong 
shift in the immigrants’ origin country composition, due to the successive policy changes 
that enabled more non-Western countries to enter the U.S. 
 
B. Immigrants’ Decision of Self-employment 
 7 
Immigrants, as well as natives, choose to work either in wage/salary sectors or 
in the self-employment sectors. The self-employment situation of immigrants is 
dissimilar from that of native-born citizens. The self-employment rate differs 
significantly not only between immigrants and natives, but also among immigrants. 
Fairlie and Mayer (1996) find that the self-employment rate of immigrants shows 
considerable differences across ethnic and racial groups, and even across larger 
categories such as Asian, Hispanic, and black people. 
The question of whether immigrants tend to be self-employed and what factors 
affect the immigrants’ probability of choosing self-employment have been debated by 
testing hypotheses in several studies. Yuengert (1995) tests three hypotheses regarding 
the self-employment decision of immigrants. He finds that self-employed immigrants are 
more likely to be from the countries with relatively high rates of self-employment, and 
that immigrants choose self-employment to avoid the burden of tax. Moreover, Clark and 
Drinkwater (1998) find that, in the U.K., the push factor affects immigrants’ decisions on 
self-employment: discrimination within the labor market leads immigrants to negatively 
choose the self-employment sector rather than the paid sector, where immigrants have a 
disadvantage in terms of wages. Borjas and Bronars (1989) find that consumer 
discrimination on culturally-specified goods discourage able immigrants to self-select 
into the self-employment sector.  
Borjas (1986) finds that immigrants are more likely to work in the 
self-employed sector than natives are. He attributes this finding to the so-called enclave 
effect. Immigrants with shared nationality, culture, and social convention create a 
community in the society. This “enclave” makes it easier for newly coming immigrants to 
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integrate into society. They may then find it easier to start up new businesses by getting 
help within the community of co-national people. This is also suggested by Evans (1989), 
who argues that a large co-national group and fluency in the origin language increase the 
probability that the members of the ethnic group are entrepreneurs, while Yuengert 
(1995) does not find evidence for the enclave effect in his analysis. Borjas (1986) also 
finds that the time spent in the U.S. also positively affects the immigrants’ entrance into 
the self-employed sector. As immigrants grow older and assimilate into the U.S. society 
and the labor market, they are more eager to start their own businesses. 
Lofstrom (2002) finds the impact of the relative success of the self-employed in 
the same statistical area on the probability of being self-employed is significant and it is 
stronger for immigrants than for natives. Rees and Shah (1986) also find the same results 
for the entire population in the U.K., explaining that people rationally choose to be 
self-employed due to the economic incentive. Moreover, Fairlie and Mayer (1996) point 
out that the wide range of self-employment rates among ethnic/racial groups are 
associated with the higher return from self-employment than wage earnings. 
Major studies find that characteristics of individuals are also significant in 
making a self-employment decision. Age and education are widely recognized by almost 
all the studies that estimate self-employment probability as major explanatory factors for 
the self-employment decision. As the individuals become older and have higher 
education, the probability of choosing self-employment rises. (Borjas and Bronars, 1989; 
Clark and Drinkwater, 1998; Gill, 1988; Kidd, 1993; Lofstrom, 2002; Rees and Shah, 
1986) Variables such as geographical location, marital status, length of residency, health, 
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and presence of children also often appear as variables in many papers, but their 
significances vary. 
 Kidd (1993), who studies the differences between the wages of immigrants and 
native-born citizens in Australia, finds that age, geographical location, length of 
residency, and presence of children have a significant impact on the self-employment 
decision. After including the sample selection correction term derived from Heckman’s 
probit model into the earnings equation of natives and immigrants in the wage sector, the 
correction term’s coefficient is negative, meaning that average earnings of paid workers 
are less than the average earnings of self-employed workers, holding their personal 
characteristics equal. He finds this result contrary to his expectation, and explains that 
this might be because the self-employment earnings of immigrants vary significantly.  
 Lofstrom (2002) finds that, by analyzing the 1980 and 1990 Census data, 
including the ethnic group dummy variable into the probit equation positively impacts 
education coefficients. Moreover, including the variables for the proportion of 
co-national population and the relative success of self-employed workers in the same 
metropolitan area positively affect the self-employment rate of immigrants, which 
supports Borjas’ enclave effect. Lofstrom particularly stresses the importance of 
controlling for co-national groups in the equations. He also addresses the problem of not 
correcting for the selection process of employment status when earnings equations are 
estimated, indicating that differences in earnings between natives and immigrants can be 
overestimated in such a case.  
 Since the wage analyses of immigrants are relatively old, this paper looks at the 
immigrants’ economic performance using the most recent data. In the wage estimates, 
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immigrants’ lengths of residency and arrival cohort indicators are included to control for 
their assimilation effect and the cohort’s different characteristics. Since predecessors 
suggest that the self-employment rate varies significantly within immigrant workers and 
the reasons for the decision vary among them, it is worth studying this in depth across 
origin countries. The probit model for the probability of being a wage earner is used to 
correct the selection bias in estimating the wage equation. In the spirit of Evans (1989), 
Rees and Shah (1986), and Lofstrom (2000), this paper estimates the probit model of 
being a wage earner using the variables for the “enclave effect,” the proportion of 
co-nationals in the same residing state, and the relative success of the self-employed. The 
variables and statistical model used in this study also follow Lofstrom.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
ECONOMETRIC MODELS FOR ESTIMATING THE PROBABILITY OF 
BEING A WAGE EARNER AND WAGE EARNINGS OF IMMIGRANTS 
This chapter describes the econometric model used to estimate the wages of 
immigrants. The first subsection discusses the estimation method to correct the sample 
selection problem. The second subsection shows the econometric model and variables 
used in the analysis. The estimation models follow Lofstrom (2002). 
 
A. Selection Bias and Heckman Model 
Given the fact that self-employment rates vary across nationalities (shown in 
chapter four in this paper), this study’s major goal is to consistently estimate the wage 
differential among immigrants. If a researcher only picks up the samples from the 
wage/salary sector when estimating wage equations, it is subject to the sample selection 
problem. It is a methodological imperfection when samples are not randomly collected, 
and therefore it makes the estimates biased. Particularly, in estimating wage equations, it 
is important to consider the initial decision of being a wage earner or self-employed. 
Sample selection problems occur often, but are likely to be ignored in a data collecting 
and analyzing process. Many studies regarding earnings or wages of immigrants often 
overlook the self-employed population. This study corrects such biases by looking at both 
populations in the wage analysis. 
This paper uses Heckman’s (1979) two-step model to correct the sample 
selection bias that can occur from excluding self-employment decision. A probit model 
was used as the first-step to estimate the probability of the sample, being a wage earner, 
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which is a binary dependent variable. The probit equation includes the factors that affect 
the probability of being a wage earner. The equation needs to include more than one 
additional explanatory variable that are relevant to the initial decision, but are irrelevant 
to the second model, the wage equation. The probit equation derives inverse Mill’s ratio, 
which is the sample selection correction term expressed by 𝜆. The term is applied in the 
second-stage OLS wage regression to correct for selection bias. Two models for the 
probit analysis and wage analysis are discussed below. 
 
B. Econometric Model to Estimate the Wages of Immigrants 
 This subsection provides the econometric models used in the analysis. I discuss 
each of the dependent variables and independent variables used in the probit equation and 
the OLS models of the wages of immigrants and natives. 
To examine the probability of being a wage earner, this study uses following 
econometric model and variables: 
 𝑊𝐴𝐺𝐸_𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁 = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐺 + 𝛽!𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽!𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑆𝑄 + 𝛽!𝐴𝐺𝐸_𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐺+ 𝛽!𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑆𝑄_𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐺 + 𝛽!𝑆𝐶𝐻𝑂𝑂𝐿 + 𝛽!𝑆𝐶𝐻𝑂𝑂𝐿_𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐺 + 𝛽!𝐿𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑁𝐺+ 𝛽!𝑀𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐸𝐷 + 𝛽!"𝐵𝐿𝐴𝐶𝐾 + 𝛽!!𝐻𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐴𝑁𝐼𝐶 + 𝛽!"𝐴𝑆𝐼𝐴𝑁+ 𝛽!"𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑅 + 𝛽!"𝐿𝐸𝑆 + 𝛽!"𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑄 + 𝛽!"𝑆𝑇_𝑖 + 𝛽!"𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷+ 𝛽!"𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐼𝑉𝐸05_09+ 𝛽!"𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐼𝑉𝐸00_04+ 𝛽!"𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐼𝑉𝐸95_99+ 𝛽!"𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐼𝑉𝐸90_94+ 𝛽!!𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑉85_89+ 𝛽!"𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐼𝑉𝐸80_84+ 𝛽!"𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐼𝑉𝐸75_79+ 𝛽!"𝐴𝑅𝑃𝑅𝐸75+ 𝛽!"𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝑖+ 𝛽!"𝐸𝑁𝐶𝐿𝐴𝑉𝐸 + 𝛽!"𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑁𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹 +   𝜖 
 
…(1) 
 
 
where 𝜖 is a stochastic error term. 
 
 
 The OLS model used to estimate the wages is as follows: 
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𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑊𝐴𝐺𝐸 = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐺 + 𝛽!𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽!𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑆𝑄 + 𝛽!𝐴𝐺𝐸_𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐺+ 𝛽!𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑆𝑄_𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐺 + 𝛽!𝑆𝐶𝐻𝑂𝑂𝐿 + 𝛽!𝑆𝐶𝐻𝑂𝑂𝐿_𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐺+ 𝛽!𝐿𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑁𝐺 + 𝛽!𝑀𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐸𝐷 + 𝛽!"𝐵𝐿𝐴𝐶𝐾 + 𝛽!!𝐻𝐼𝑆𝑃𝐴𝑁𝐼𝐶+ 𝛽!"𝐴𝑆𝐼𝐴𝑁 + 𝛽!"𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑅 + 𝛽!"𝐿𝐸𝑆 + 𝛽!"𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑄 + 𝛽!"𝑆𝑇_𝑖+ 𝛽!"𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷 + 𝛽!"𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐼𝑉𝐸05_09+ 𝛽!"𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐼𝑉𝐸00_04+ 𝛽!"𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐼𝑉𝐸95_99+ 𝛽!"𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐼𝑉𝐸90_94+ 𝛽!!𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑉85_89+ 𝛽!"𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐼𝑉𝐸80_84+ 𝛽!"𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐼𝑉𝐸75_79+ 𝛽!"𝐴𝑅𝑃𝑅𝐸75+ 𝛽!"𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝑖 +   𝜆 +   𝜖 
 
     …(2) 
 
 
where 𝜖 is a stochastic error term. 
 
 
Definitions of Variables 
 
Dependent variables 
WAGE_EARN 1 if the individual is a wage earner; 0 otherwise 
LOGWAGE Logged annual wages 
 
Independent variables 
General Characteristics 
IMMIG* 1 if the individual is an immigrant; 0 otherwise 
AGE Age of the individual (in years) 
AGESQ Age of the individual squared 
AGE_IMMIG* Interaction term for AGE and IMMIG 
AGESQ_IMMIG* Interaction term for AGESQ and IMMIG 
SCHOOOL Years of schooling 
SCHOOL_IMMIG* Interaction term for SCHOOL and IMMIG 
LIMENG* 1 if the individual speaks little or no English; 0 
otherwise 
MARRIED 1 if the individual is married; 0 otherwise 
Race (reference group: non-Hispanic White) 
BLACK 1 if the individual is non-Hispanic Black; 0 
otherwise 
HISPANIC 1 if the individual is Hispanic; 0 otherwise 
ASIAN 1 if the individual is Asian; 0 otherwise 
OTHER 1 if the individual is a race other than White, 
Black, Hispanic, or Asian; 0 otherwise 
LES* Length of residency 
LESSQ* Length of residency squared 
ST_i Dummy variable that indicates which state the 
individual lives in 
PERIOD 1 if the data is from 2003 
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Cohort effect * (reference group: 2010-2013 arrivals) 
ARRIVE05_09 1 if the individual arrived during 2005-2009; 0 
otherwise 
ARRIVE00_04 1 if the individual arrived during 2000-2004; 0 
otherwise 
ARRIVE95_99 1 if the individual arrived during 1995-1999; 0 
otherwise 
ARRIVE90_94 1 if the individual arrived during 1990-1994; 0 
otherwise 
ARRIVE85_89 1 if the individual arrived during 1985-1989; 0 
otherwise 
ARRIVE80_84 1 if the individual arrived during 1980-1984; 0 
otherwise 
ARRIVE75_79 1 if the individual arrived during 1975-1979; 0 
otherwise 
ARPRE75 1 if the individual arrived before 1975; 0 
otherwise 
Country of Origin * (reference group: those from Canada) 
COUNTRY_i* Dummy variable that indicates the individual’s 
origin country 
Enclave effect and Earnings Differential 
ENCLAVE Proportion of immigrants from the same country 
of the total population by state and year 
EARNDIFF Ratio of self-employment earnings to wage/salary 
earnings (by state, year, and country of origin for 
immigrants; by state, year, and ethnicity for 
natives) 𝜆   Sample selection correction term calculated by 
using the inverse Mills ratio 
 
*: hold 0 for natives 
 
 
 
 The dependent variable used in the first-stage probit equation is a dummy 
variable that indicates if the individual is a wage earner. Given that an individual might 
report earnings from both sectors, the definition of a wage earner used in this study is 
based on reported class of worker. Self-employed workers who also reported wage 
earnings were not included in wage workers. The dependent variable for annual logged 
wage is used in regular OLS and Heckman second-stage OLS models. I adjusted all the 
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earnings values from the 2003 data into 2013 price using the Consumer Price Index from 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
 I use the independent variable that indicates whether the individual is an 
immigrant to examine the effect of being an immigrant on wages. Age and years of 
schooling are frequently used variables in earnings equations. They are also the essential 
variables that affect employment status decision as many studies have recognized (Borjas 
and Bronars, 1989; Clark and Drinkwater, 1998; Gill, 1988; Kidd, 1993; Lofstrom, 2002; 
Rees and Shah, 1986). I expect that age will positively impact earnings and negatively 
impact the probability of being a wage earner. An immigrant is likely to choose 
self-employment as he/she assimilates into U.S. society (Borjas, 1986). Because of the 
way the data for education attainment is recorded, I calculated the years of schooling 
following the procedure used by Lofstrom (2002).2 Years of schooling should also 
impact the probability of being a wage earner as well as wage earnings, as the literature 
presented in chapter two show the positive effect of education on the self-employment 
rate of immigrants. Therefore, it should have a negative impact on being a wage earner. 
Limited English skill should also have a negative impact on wages and a positive impact 
on being a wage earner because, as education, English skill is counted as one form of 
human capital and operating a business requires a higher level of English. 
Furthermore, I control for marital status, though Hout and Rosen (1999) discuss 
that it is not always an exogenous factor. State dummy variables are included to control 
                                                
2 Following Lofstrom (2002), the calculation for years of schooling is as follows: No schooling completed 
and kindergarten are coded as 0 years of schooling; nursery school to fourth grade are as 2.5 years; fifth 
through eighth grade as 6.5 years; ninth grade as 9 years; tenth grade as 10 years; eleventh or twelfth grade 
without a high school diploma as 11 years; high school graduate and GED or alternative credential as 12 
years; some college with no degree as 13 years, associate degree as 14 years, bachelor’s degree as 16 years, 
master’s degree as 17 years and professional and doctorate degree as 20 years. 
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for geographical locations. Immigrants tend to concentrate in fewer major cities than 
natives do (Butcher and Card, 1991). Kidd (1993) includes dummy variables for 
metropolitan areas by state and finds a more significant positive impact on the 
self-employment decision of natives than that of immigrants. Length of residency 
estimates the assimilation effect of immigrants. Period effect controls for the secular 
change in labor market and economic situation between the two years. 
 The arrival cohort dummy variables account for the intrinsic differences across 
the immigrant arrival cohorts. This is intended to update Lofstrom’s model, whose 
equation covers immigrant cohorts up until 1984. I suppose that the extent of their effects 
to show a different picture than those of Lofstrom because it is highly possible that the 
current labor market, economy, and public policies on migration in the U.S. have 
changed from decades ago. Most importantly, national origin composition has changed 
from the 1990s. Asian immigrants now compose around 40 percent of the entire 
population obtaining permanent resident status (Office of Immigration Statistics, 2013b), 
though it was around 30 percent in the 1990s. Borjas (1985, 1994a) frequently studies the 
cohort effect along with the assimilation effect on immigrants’ economic performance by 
tracking each cohort, and he finds the successive decline of the relative entry wages of 
newly arriving immigrants up until the 1980s, even though it is at a declining rate. This 
study controls for such difference of “quality” of immigrants by using arrival cohort 
dummy variables. 
 The dummy variables of country of origin are the most important variables in 
the analysis. The previous studies that deal with immigrants’ earnings by including 
individuals’ race as an explanatory variable often only look at the larger ethnic/racial 
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categories. This is mostly because of the limited number of samples. However, the larger 
categories of ethnicity do not reveal the origin country difference within the group. In the 
estimate, I include all the countries with a reference group of those from Canada. 
 ENCLAVE is one of the key variables in the probit equation, which measures 
the enclave effect on the probability of being a wage earner for immigrants. The idea 
follows Lofstrom, but it is calculated by state and year. The value is the number of 
immigrants in a state divided by the total population of the state. A number of studies 
find the positive effect of the co-national enclaves on self-employment decision, though 
Yuengert (1995) does not find such effect. Enclaves are likely to provide the co-national 
immigrants with support and easier access to the self-employment sector, which is 
usually considered riskier than wage/salary sectors. Therefore, the higher the 
concentration of co-nationals living in the same area is, the more likely it is that 
immigrants are encouraged to have their own businesses. The earnings differential 
variable examines how the ratio of self-employment earnings to wage/salary earnings 
affects the decision of whether or not to be wage earner. I expect that the higher earnings 
for self-employment workers lead to fewer number of people who wish to become a wage 
earner. Particularly, Lofstrom (2000) finds that there is a stronger effect of the wage 
differential on immigrants’ self-employment decision than that of natives. These two 
variables are only included in the first-stage probit model. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
SELECTING THE SAMPLE FROM THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 
PUMS DATA 
This chapter describes the data from the 2003 and 2013 American Community 
Survey PUMS (Public Use Microdata Sample). It also provides descriptive statistics for 
selected samples used in the analysis. 
 
A. Overview of the 2003 and 2013 PUMS Data from the American Community Survey 
The American Community Survey by the Census Bureau collects data of the 
population and households. Unlike the previous Census of Population that produced data 
once in a decade, the American Community Survey collects and produces data every 
year. The survey is conducted in the form of questionnaire by mail or phone throughout 
the year. PUMS data is a collection of cross-sectional samples of persons and households 
from the American Community Survey. The dataset includes various socioeconomic, 
household, and geographic information such as age, sex, education attainment, 
relationships in a household, place of birth, years of entry, employment and work status, 
income, and language ability. PUMS data has currently the largest sample size among 
other available population dataset. In comparison with the popular Current Population 
Survey data, PUMS data has samples of 3,000,000, while CPS has that of 200,000, and 
more detailed geographic information. 
 
B. Selection of Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
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In this analysis, I use the 2003 and 2013 one-year PUMS data. The two sets of 
samples are used to create immigrant cohorts over several decades. The collection of 
sample basically follows that of Lofstrom (2002). The sample individuals are males 
whose ages are between 18 and 64. Those who reported to be attending school, 
unemployed, working without pay, or in armed forces are excluded from the sample. The 
definition of an immigrant throughout the study is based on citizenship status: those who 
are not citizens of the U.S. at birth are categorized as immigrants. Therefore, the children 
of immigrants born in the U.S. are considered as the native-born. Because of the large 
size of the data, I keep all the immigrants in the sample but randomly extract 20 percent 
of natives. Unlike Lofstrom, I keep all the origin countries. The resulted overall sample 
size is 275,949, with 129,595 of immigrants and 146,354 of natives.3 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for immigrants and natives, 
respectively. On average, immigrants have approximately 1.5 years less schooling. 
Moreover, about 26 percent of immigrants report they do not speak English well or at all. 
Interestingly, the number of married men is approximately 7 percentage points higher for 
immigrants. 
Table 2 presents self-employment rates by country of origin. While there is a 
large gap among the number of observations for each origin country, self-employment 
rates vary significantly across the origin countries. The countries with more than 25 
percent of self-employment in both years are: Greece, Slovakia, Lithuania, Afghanistan, 
Iran, Israel, Jordan, Korea, and Syria.4 On the other hand, the countries with less than ten 
                                                
3 In calculating the earnings differential for immigrants and natives, females and those who work without 
pay are also included. No restrictions on the sample were set when deriving enclave variables. 
4 Iceland has self-employment rates of 50 percent in 2003 and 40 percent in 2013, but it has relatively 
small population in the data (2 individuals in 2003 and 10 individuals in 2013). 
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percent of self-employment in both years are: Indonesia, Laos, Nepal, the Philippines, Sri 
Lanka, Barbados, Haiti, Guyana, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Ghana, Liberia, Micronesia, 
and Samoa. One might conclude that European countries tend to have higher 
self-employment rates and the majority of countries with a small proportion of 
self-employed people are from developing countries, especially from Africa. However, 
Table 2 indicates that there is no strong evidence for the tendencies of self-employment 
rates across regions or continents. For example, those from Greece have 36.6 percent of 
self-employment rate, while those who from Norway have 9.5 percent self-employment 
rate in 2003. 
Table 3 provides self-employment rates by immigrant arrival cohorts. The most 
recent arrival cohort has the lowest self-employment rate. Tracing the specific arrival 
cohort by comparing data from 2003 and 2013, we see that the self-employment increases 
for most of the arrival cohorts after they spend more time in the U.S. This is suggested by 
other studies regarding the assimilation effect on immigrants’ choice of self-employment 
(Borjas, 1986; Lofstrom, 2002).  
Education attainment by country of origin is shown in Table 4. Education 
levels vary across countries as well. The majority of developed countries have high rates 
of more than college degree. Especially, Norway, Switzerland, and Sweden, India, 
Taiwan, Malaysia, and Libya have the highest percentages of more than college degrees 
(more than 70 percent). Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Azores Islands are found to 
have more than 50 percent of those who do not have a high school diploma. 
Table 5 presents education attainment and English proficiency by immigrant 
arrival cohorts. It suggests remarkable characteristics of the most recent cohorts who 
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immigrated during the twentieth century. Although there is a secular decline of the 
proportions of those with more than college degree until 2000 arrivals, the recent arrival 
cohorts of 2000-04, 2005-09, and 2010-13 have higher proportions of immigrants with 
more than college degrees. From 2003 to 2013, the most recent cohorts’ proportion of 
those with less than high school degree decreases and that of those with more than 
college degree increases. Particularly, as for 2010-2013 arrivals, nearly 50 percent of the 
immigrants who migrated most recently have more than college degrees at the time of 
entry. This also contributes to the increase in years of schooling for immigrants shown in 
column 3. Column 3 shows the mean of years of schooling by arrival cohorts along with 
that of natives. Whereas the most recent cohort in 2003 has the lowest average years of 
schooling, the most recent cohort in 2013 has the highest average years of schooling, and 
it seems to have started to increase from the 2000-2004 arrivals.  
Table 6 provides the mean of annual wage and self-employment earnings of 
immigrants, natives and each arrival cohort. The same table by country of origin is found 
in Appendix (Table A1). In most cases, wage/salary earnings are larger than 
self-employment earnings because self-employed individuals might report negative 
earnings. The mean of wage of the most recent cohort at the time of entry in 2003 is 
42,221 dollars, while that of 2013 is much higher: 50,204 dollars. Almost all the arrival 
cohort shows the increase in wages after ten years. As for self-employment earnings, 
every arrival cohort’s earnings decrease from 2003 to 2013. Furthermore, the 
self-employment earnings at the time of entry in 2013 are much lower than that of 2003.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ESTIMATION RESULTS: ASSESSING EMPLOYMENT STATUS DECISION  
AND THE WAGES OF IMMIGRANTS 
This chapter provides the results of the regression analysis. The explanations 
for the findings are presented in the following two subsections. The first subsection 
discusses the factors affecting the decision to be a wage earner. The second subsection 
discusses the OLS results for the wages of immigrants. 
 
A. Decision of Being a Wage Earner 
 Table 7 shows the regression results for the first stage of the Heckman two-step 
procedure (the probit model) to examine the probability of being a wage earner. As noted 
above, the enclave and earnings differential variables are the key variables included in the 
probit estimation and are considered not to affect the wages. As expected, on average, 
age, years of schooling, and lengths of residency have significant and negative effects on 
the probability of being a wage earner. The model implies that as one spends more time 
in the U.S. and spends more years in school, the probability of being a wage earner 
decreases at an increasing rate. It is also the case that age and years of schooling affect 
the decision of being a wage earner differently for immigrants.  
The inverse Mills ratio, the correction term that is inserted in the wage 
regression, is derived from this model. Both the enclave and earnings differential 
variables have negative impacts on being a wage earner and are statistically significant. 
This supports Lofstrom (2002), who finds positive marginal effects for both enclave and 
earnings differential variables on the probability of being self-employed. This probit 
model suggests that immigrants are less likely to choose to be a wage earner when there 
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are more co-nationals from the same country in the same state. In other words, when 
there are more co-nationals from the same country in the state, an immigrant is more 
likely to choose self-employment. Immigrants, so as natives, are also affected by the 
economic situations of the two sectors: an individual is likely to be self-employed when 
he finds self-employed people have higher earnings in the same residing state, holding 
other variables constant. 
 
B. Wages of Immigrants after Correcting Self-Selection 
Table 8 displays the two OLS regression results without and with the sample 
selection correction term, which is the inverse Mills ratio derived from the model in 
Table 7. As expected, both OLS and Heckman OLS show positive and significant effects 
of age, years of schooling, and length of residency on wages, controlling for other 
variables. The effects of age and years of schooling with and without the correction term 
are of similar magnitudes. Also, the interaction terms of age and immigrant, so as years 
of schooling and immigrants, show negative coefficients. It suggests that age and years of 
schooling have lesser effects on immigrants’ wages than on natives. These findings 
correspond with Lofstrom (2002). 
Furthermore, correcting self-selection significantly affects wage differences 
among ethnicities. The estimated coefficients for all the racial controls decrease when the 
correction term is included in the model. For example, the first model suggests being 
Asian decreases wages by two percent, while the second model with the correction term 
estimates the effect is about a ten percent decrease. Hence, Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians 
earn much less than White counterparts in the wage sector. This reveals that regular wage 
OLS regression tends to underestimate the effect of not being white. Additionally, the 
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model without the correction term, in general, overestimates the wages of arrival cohorts 
before 2000. 
The results obtained from Table 8 show notable findings on the wages of 
immigrants from each country of origin. Since there are many variables for origin 
countries, the discussion here mainly focuses on the estimates with statistical 
significance. Almost all the origin country dummy variables show negative coefficients. 
While the coefficient difference between regular OLS and Heckman OLS varies among 
countries, including the correction term causes significant changes in some origin country 
coefficients. Heckman OLS shows that those from Denmark and Switzerland earn 
approximately 40 percent or more in the wage sector in comparison with those from 
Canada. The coefficients of both countries are underestimated in the OLS regression 
without the correction term. On the other hand, variables for countries such as Laos, the 
Philippines, Yemen, Sudan, and Micronesia have a significantly negative impact on 
wages.5 For example, immigrants from the Philippines have approximately 54 percent 
lower wages than those from Canada, holding other variables constant. As for Finland, 
Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Armenia, Korea, Pakistan, Syria, Brazil, Ethiopia, Morocco, 
Sudan, and New Zealand, the estimate coefficients change significantly after including 
the correction term, and their effects are underestimated in the normal OLS wage 
regression. The major finding here is that the majority of countries that are 
underestimated without the correction term, including some countries listed above, tend 
to have high self-employment rates. This suggests that if the country has a relatively 
higher proportion of self-employed workers than the average, the wage of immigrants 
                                                
5 Samoa has a coefficient of -1.1463, (and the percentage effect is exp(-1.1463)-1=-0.81) but has relatively 
small population in the data (30 wage earners and 0 self-employed workers), and is excluded from the 
probit model because of collinearity. 
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who are from the country is likely to be estimated inconsistently in a regular wage 
regression.  
The negative sign of the correction term suggests that the wage earners are 
negatively selecting into the wage/salary sector. This is a major difference from Lofstrom 
(2002), who finds positive selections for the wage/salary sector and negative selections 
for the self-employment sector. Negative selection into the wage sector means that wage 
earners are earning less than what they would earn if they had chosen to be 
self-employed. This is counter-intuitive, and different studies have different (positive or 
negative) results for self-selection into a sector. An Australian study by Kidd (1993) finds 
wage/salary workers’ negative selection into the sector as well, but he discusses that it is 
reasonable for the negative selection to arise, when the individuals’ wages and what they 
would earn in self-employment sector are positively correlated, and the self-employment 
earnings are more widely distributed than the earnings in the wage sector. Taking the 
same approach, Borjas and Bronars (1989) explains negative selection into the 
self-employment sector among Hispanics and Asians. Given that, Table 9 shows the 
descriptive statistics of wages and self-employment earnings with corresponding standard 
deviations. It suggests that the standard deviations of the self-employment earnings are 
not much different than that of wage earnings for both natives and immigrants. Therefore, 
Kidd’s (1993) argument does not apply in this case. 
In addition, following Lofstrom (2002), this study produces predicted 
age-earnings profiles derived from the wage equation estimates without and with the 
correction term. Figure 1 shows predicted age-earnings profiles based on the OLS 
estimations and Figure 2 shows the same profiles based on Heckman-OLS estimations. 
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Both diagrams in Figure 3 are above those in Figure 2, since the negative selection into 
the wage/salary sector suggests that the self-employed workers earn more than the wage 
earners with the same characteristics. Moreover, the wage gap between natives and 
immigrants decreases when self-selection is controlled for. Unlike Lofstrom (2002), the 
average earnings of natives’ are lower than that of immigrants when they enter the labor 
market in both Figure 2 and Figure 3. This might be because the recent immigrants are 
more educated and skilled than before as Table 5 suggests.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSIONS 
A. Summary of Findings 
 Using the data from the 2003 and 2013 American Community Survey PUMS, 
this study investigates the wages of immigrants correcting the potential bias of samples. 
Following the models used by Lofstrom (2002), this paper also analyzes how 
immigrants’ “enclave” and relative success of self-employed worker affect the 
probability of being a wage earner. Moreover, each origin country variable is controlled 
in the analysis. 
 This study finds that the proportion of the immigrants from the same country in 
the same state negatively affects the decision of being a wage earner. The more 
co-nationals there are in the state, the less likely an individual chooses to be a wage 
earner. Moreover, the ratio of self-employment earnings to wage/salary earnings impacts 
the probability of being a wage earner as well. When self-employed workers have 
advantages over wage workers in terms of earnings, the individual is likely to choose to 
be self-employed, rather than a wage earner. These findings agree with Lofstrom (2002). 
 Estimating wage OLS equations without and with the correction term suggests 
that correcting the sample selection bias is of importance when analyzing the wages of 
immigrants. The wages of certain countries are estimated inconsistently without the 
correction term. Most importantly, this study finds that the wages of the countries that 
have relatively higher self-employment rates are likely to be distorted in the wage 
equation. The change in the coefficients between the two models also suggests that 
Asians have much lower wages than in regular wage estimation.  
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B. Policy Implications 
 The findings of this paper provide an important implication that the wage 
estimation should be done with the correction term of sample selection bias. Only using 
wages of immigrant wage earners does not reflect their economic performances in the 
society. Even though self-employed population is much smaller than wage/salary worker 
population, self-employed workers have to be taken into account in order to avoid 
selection bias in the estimate. Policy makers can utilize this result as a way to understand 
how immigrants, by origin countries, are performing in the U.S. labor market.  
 
C. Suggestions for Future Research 
 While this study reveals the consistently estimated wage differential among 
immigrants in comparison with natives, all the results shown in this study are not 
weighted because of the time limitations. The more consistent results would be found if 
one further estimates the Heckman model using weight. Secondly, the negative selection 
into the wage sectors is found to be counter-intuitive. This might be related to the skill 
change of immigrants in recent years, but the explanations are limited. Furthermore, 
because this study suggests that the skill decline of immigrants might not be the case 
anymore after the 2000s, it is worth continuing to study the recent immigrants’ economic 
performance and its changes over time. 
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Figure 1: Persons obtaining legal permanent resident status: fiscal years 1820 to 2010  
 
Source: Department of Homeland Security (2013),  Table 1. 
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Figure 2: Predicted age-earnings profiles, based on the OLS estimates in Table 8 
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Figure 3: Predicted age-earnings profiles, based on the Heckman-OLS estimates in Table 8 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for natives and immigrants 
 Immigrants Natives 
     
 
Variables 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Logged wage 10.4980 (0.9503) 10.6604 (0.9463) 
General Characteristics     
Age (years) 42.1949 (11.0673) 43.1314 (11.9561) 
Age squared 1902.8968 (943.3689) 2003.2668 (1016.1905) 
Years of schooling 12.1921 (4.6134) 13.6625 (2.6812) 
Limited English 0.2560 (0.4364) 0 (0) 
Married 0.7075 (0.4549) 0.6415 (0.4796) 
Black 0.0585 (0.2346) 0.0734 (0.2608) 
Hispanic 0.4745 (0.4994) 0.0652 (0.2469) 
Asian 0.2547 (0.4357) 0.0109 (0.1036) 
Other race 0.0189 (0.1361) 0.0229 (0.1495) 
Length of residency (years) 19.4099 (12.0462) 0 (0) 
Length of residency 521.8543 (582.3413) 0 (0) 
Period effect (2003) 0.2351 (0.4240) 0.2976 (0.4572) 
Arrival Cohorts     
2010-13 Arrivals 0.0495 (0.2169) 0 (0) 
2005-09 Arrivals 0.0864 (0.2809) 0 (0) 
2000-04 Arrivals 0.1532 (0.3602) 0 (0) 
1995-99 Arrivals 0.1612 (0.3677) 0 (0) 
1990-94 Arrivals 0.1405 (0.3475) 0 (0) 
1985-89 Arrivals 0.1303 (0.3367) 0 (0) 
1980-84 Arrivals 0.1079 (0.3103) 0 (0) 
1975-79 Arrivals 0.0734 (0.2608) 0 (0) 
Pre-1975 Arrivals 0.0976 (0.2967) 0 (0) 
Country of origin     
Albania 0.0017 (0.0410) 0 (0) 
Austria 0.0011 (0.0325) 0 (0) 
Belgium 0.0008 (0.0276) 0 (0) 
Bulgaria 0.0018 (0.0419) 0 (0) 
Czechoslovakia 0.0004 (0.0196) 0 (0) 
Denmark 0.0008 (0.0289) 0 (0) 
Finland 0.0005 (0.0224) 0 (0) 
France 0.0049 (0.0700) 0 (0) 
Germany 0.0113 (0.1058) 0 (0) 
Greece 0.0035 (0.0594) 0 (0) 
Hungary 0.0015 (0.0384) 0 (0) 
Iceland 0.0001 (0.0096) 0 (0) 
Ireland 0.0038 (0.0617) 0 (0) 
Italy 0.0081 (0.0895) 0 (0) 
Netherlands 0.0027 (0.0521) 0 (0) 
Norway 0.0006 (0.0242) 0 (0) 
Poland 0.0114 (0.1060) 0 (0) 
Portugal 0.0051 (0.0713) 0 (0) 
Azores Islands 0.0005 (0.0226) 0 (0) 
Romania 0.0043 (0.0653) 0 (0) 
Spain 0.0022 (0.0472) 0 (0) 
Sweden 0.0010 (0.0313) 0 (0) 
Switzerland 0.0012 (0.0345) 0 (0) 
United Kingdom 0.0207 (0.1423) 0 (0) 
Yugoslavia 0.0014 (0.0368) 0 (0) 
Czech Republic 0.0006 (0.0253) 0 (0) 
Slovakia 0.0004 (0.0208) 0 (0) 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.0034 (0.0578) 0 (0) 
Croatia 0.0011 (0.0326) 0 (0) 
Macedonia 0.0006 (0.0250) 0 (0) 
Serbia 0.0008 (0.0287) 0 (0) 
Latvia 0.0003 (0.0184) 0 (0) 
Lithuania 0.0008 (0.0280) 0 (0) 
Armenia 0.0017 (0.0411) 0 (0) 
Azerbaijan 0.0004 (0.0206) 0 (0) 
Belarus 0.0011 (0.0331) 0 (0) 
Georgia 0.0004 (0.0192) 0 (0) 
Moldova 0.0007 (0.0272) 0 (0) 
Russia 0.0073 (0.0852) 0 (0) 
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Ukraine 0.0070 (0.0835) 0 (0) 
USSR 0.0012 (0.0348) 0 (0) 
Other Europe, N.S. 0.0013 (0.0359) 0 (0) 
Afghanistan 0.0015 (0.0391) 0 (0) 
Bangladesh 0.0049 (0.0700) 0 (0) 
Myanmar 0.0023 (0.0479) 0 (0) 
Cambodia 0.0033 (0.0576) 0 (0) 
China 0.0354 (0.1849) 0 (0) 
Cyprus 0.0003 (0.0167) 0 (0) 
Hong Kong 0.0076 (0.0868) 0 (0) 
India 0.0612 (0.2396) 0 (0) 
Indonesia 0.0022 (0.0466) 0 (0) 
Iran 0.0096 (0.0977) 0 (0) 
Iraq 0.0033 (0.0570) 0 (0) 
Israel 0.0038 (0.0617) 0 (0) 
Japan 0.0074 (0.0856) 0 (0) 
Jordan 0.0018 (0.0418) 0 (0) 
Korea 0.0210 (0.1434) 0 (0) 
Kuwait 0.0007 (0.0266) 0 (0) 
Laos 0.0052 (0.0717) 0 (0) 
Lebanon 0.0042 (0.0643) 0 (0) 
Malaysia 0.0019 (0.0438) 0 (0) 
Nepal 0.0015 (0.0384) 0 (0) 
Pakistan 0.0096 (0.0975) 0 (0) 
Philippines 0.0404 (0.1970) 0 (0) 
Saudi Arabia 0.0006 (0.0245) 0 (0) 
Singapore 0.0006 (0.0250) 0 (0) 
Sri Lanka 0.0014 (0.0378) 0 (0) 
Syria 0.0020 (0.0441) 0 (0) 
Taiwan 0.0104 (0.1015) 0 (0) 
Thailand 0.0035 (0.0592) 0 (0) 
Turkey 0.0031 (0.0554) 0 (0) 
Uzbekistan 0.0010 (0.0310) 0 (0) 
Vietnam 0.0336 (0.1802) 0 (0) 
Yemen 0.0010 (0.0312) 0 (0) 
Asia 0.0012 (0.0340) 0 (0) 
Other Asia, N.S. 0.0021 (0.0453) 0 (0) 
Bermuda 0.0001 (0.0100) 0 (0) 
Canada 0.0226 (0.1486) 0 (0) 
Mexico 0.3133 (0.4638) 0 (0) 
Belize 0.0008 (0.0287) 0 (0) 
Costa Rica 0.0021 (0.0456) 0 (0) 
El Salvador 0.0314 (0.1744) 0 (0) 
Guatemala 0.0247 (0.1551) 0 (0) 
Honduras 0.0108 (0.1036) 0 (0) 
Nicaragua 0.0056 (0.0748) 0 (0) 
Panama 0.0016 (0.0400) 0 (0) 
Antigua & Barbuda 0.0003 (0.0162) 0 (0) 
Bahamas 0.0007 (0.0256) 0 (0) 
Barbados 0.0010 (0.0313) 0 (0) 
Cuba 0.0222 (0.1474) 0 (0) 
Dominica 0.0005 (0.0232) 0 (0) 
Dominican Republic 0.0153 (0.1228) 0 (0) 
Grenada 0.0007 (0.0265) 0 (0) 
Haiti 0.0103 (0.1010) 0 (0) 
Jamaica 0.0127 (0.1120) 0 (0) 
St. Vincent & the Grenadines 0.0004 (0.0188) 0 (0) 
Trinidad & Tobago 0.0048 (0.0689) 0 (0) 
West Indies 0.0007 (0.0260) 0 (0) 
Caribbean, N.S. 0.0007 (0.0273) 0 (0) 
Argentina 0.0048 (0.0691) 0 (0) 
Bolivia 0.0016 (0.0400) 0 (0) 
Brazil 0.0080 (0.0890) 0 (0) 
Chile 0.0023 (0.0483) 0 (0) 
Colombia 0.0136 (0.1158) 0 (0) 
Ecuador 0.0097 (0.0979) 0 (0) 
Guyana 0.0062 (0.0786) 0 (0) 
Paraguay 0.0003 (0.0184) 0 (0) 
Peru 0.0096 (0.0977) 0 (0) 
Uruguay 0.0012 (0.0351) 0 (0) 
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Venezuela 0.0042 (0.0645) 0 (0) 
South America 0.0003 (0.0184) 0 (0) 
Americas, N.S. 0.0006 (0.0245) 0 (0) 
Algeria 0.0006 (0.0255) 0 (0) 
Cameroon 0.0007 (0.0262) 0 (0) 
Cape Verde 0.0007 (0.0263) 0 (0) 
Egypt 0.0047 (0.0682) 0 (0) 
Ethiopia 0.0037 (0.0609) 0 (0) 
Eritrea 0.0007 (0.0263) 0 (0) 
Ghana 0.0033 (0.0572) 0 (0) 
Kenya 0.0019 (0.0439) 0 (0) 
Liberia 0.0012 (0.0349) 0 (0) 
Libya 0.0002 (0.0136) 0 (0) 
Morocco 0.0019 (0.0438) 0 (0) 
Nigeria 0.0048 (0.0689) 0 (0) 
Sierra Leone 0.0007 (0.0258) 0 (0) 
Somalia 0.0009 (0.0299) 0 (0) 
South Africa 0.0030 (0.0544) 0 (0) 
Sudan 0.0008 (0.0280) 0 (0) 
Tanzania 0.0005 (0.0215) 0 (0) 
Uganda 0.0005 (0.0226) 0 (0) 
Zimbabwe 0.0005 (0.0227) 0 (0) 
Africa 0.0021 (0.0453) 0 (0) 
Eastern Africa, N.S. 0.0007 (0.0258) 0 (0) 
Western Africa, N.S. 0.0012 (0.0346) 0 (0) 
Other Africa, N.S. 0.0028 (0.0529) 0 (0) 
Australia 0.0028 (0.0524) 0 (0) 
Fiji 0.0010 (0.0315) 0 (0) 
Micronesia 0.0004 (0.0196) 0 (0) 
New Zealand 0.0011 (0.0326) 0 (0) 
Tonga 0.0004 (0.0196) 0 (0) 
Samoa 0.0002 (0.0152) 0 (0) 
Other US Island Areas, N.S. 0.0005 (0.0229) 0 (0) 
Enclave effect and Earnings Differential    
Proportion of immigrants from the 
same country   of the total 
population by state and year 
2.9381 (4.0891) 0 (0) 
Ratio of self-employment earnings to 
wage/salary   earnings (by state, 
year, and country of origin for 
immigrants; by state, year, and 
ethnicity for natives) 
0.7542 (1.3239) 0.6692 (0.1179) 
    
Observations 129,595 146,354 
Note: Unweighted results. State dummy variables are not shown in the table. 
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Table 2: Self-employment rates by country of origin 
 
 
Countries 
2003 2013 
Albania 10.8 13.8 
Austria 26.2 22.4 
Belgium 25.0 18.7 
Bulgaria 20.8 18.3 
Czechoslovakia 23.8 24.1 
Denmark 19.0 16.7 
Finland 32.0 17.5 
France 15.4 13.9 
Germany 18.7 13.0 
Greece 36.6 32.2 
Hungary 16.7 21.4 
Iceland 50.0 40.0 
Ireland 26.4 22.0 
Italy 20.7 20.5 
Netherlands 21.6 16.2 
Norway 9.5 18.2 
Poland 20.5 19.0 
Portugal 12.7 14.8 
Azores Islands 12.0 24.4 
Romania 21.5 20.2 
Spain 14.8 12.7 
Sweden 10.6 18.8 
Switzerland 16.3 21.6 
United Kingdom 14.5 15.5 
Yugoslavia 22.0 23.4 
Czech Republic 14.8 37.5 
Slovakia 31.3 27.5 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 8.3 13.7 
Croatia 24.5 11.2 
Macedonia 23.3 23.5 
Serbia 10.5 13.6 
Latvia 28.6 16.7 
Lithuania 25.0 30.8 
Armenia 32.7 23.4 
Azerbaijan 0.0 19.2 
Belarus 11.1 19.4 
Georgia 0.0 21.4 
Moldova 15.4 21.7 
Russia 16.4 18.2 
Ukraine 15.8 18.0 
USSR 20.0 13.7 
Other Europe, N.S. 20.6 17.3 
Afghanistan 32.7 26.6 
Bangladesh 16.7 15.6 
Myanmar 14.0 5.1 
Cambodia 15.2 12.3 
China 13.7 12.1 
Cyprus 7.7 43.5 
Hong Kong 17.3 8.8 
India 14.0 10.2 
Indonesia 9.8 8.0 
Iran 29.3 28.8 
Iraq 15.6 21.7 
Israel 31.0 33.6 
Japan 16.3 14.2 
Jordan 47.3 27.3 
Korea 30.7 25.8 
Kuwait 24.0 17.9 
Laos 8.6 7.6 
Lebanon 25.2 24.8 
Malaysia 11.9 9.7 
Nepal 5.3 5.8 
Pakistan 20.1 21.0 
Philippines 7.1 5.2 
Saudi Arabia 40.0 10.3 
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Singapore 18.2 10.2 
Sri Lanka 9.3 7.7 
Syria 25.8 27.7 
Taiwan 16.3 14.4 
Thailand 18.4 11.3 
Turkey 21.2 20.3 
Uzbekistan 42.9 16.9 
Vietnam 13.8 13.2 
Yemen 16.7 21.6 
Asia 39.5 22.3 
Other Asia, N.S. 15.4 9.1 
Bermuda 0.0 16.7 
Canada 18.5 17.4 
Mexico 8.0 10.9 
Belize 11.1 10.1 
Costa Rica 8.6 19.0 
El Salvador 6.2 10.7 
Guatemala 5.7 12.0 
Honduras 13.7 10.3 
Nicaragua 6.7 11.1 
Panama 4.3 11.1 
Antigua & Barbuda 16.7 3.6 
Bahamas 15.8 7.6 
Barbados 2.5 4.6 
Cuba 20.2 18.1 
Dominica 13.3 12.7 
Dominican Republic 7.8 10.9 
Grenada 15.4 9.2 
Haiti 6.1 7.2 
Jamaica 12.2 10.7 
St. Vincent & the Grenadines 0.0 14.0 
Trinidad & Tobago 10.5 10.5 
West Indies 9.4 10.7 
Caribbean, N.S. 11.8 11.1 
Argentina 24.2 20.9 
Bolivia 10.4 13.1 
Brazil 16.7 24.7 
Chile 18.2 18.1 
Colombia 13.4 16.8 
Ecuador 7.3 11.4 
Guyana 8.7 9.8 
Paraguay 0.0 25.0 
Peru 13.1 14.7 
Uruguay 23.1 27.3 
Venezuela 24.5 16.9 
South America 28.6 13.0 
Americas, N.S. 0.0 9.4 
Algeria 21.4 17.1 
Cameroon 7.7 6.6 
Cape Verde 7.7 0.0 
Egypt 17.5 16.9 
Ethiopia 13.2 16.3 
Eritrea 21.4 15.8 
Ghana 7.1 8.7 
Kenya 18.6 9.2 
Liberia 6.3 3.6 
Libya 14.3 11.8 
Morocco 25.0 19.3 
Nigeria 13.9 12.1 
Sierra Leone 9.1 12.5 
Somalia 0.0 11.2 
South Africa 12.6 16.8 
Sudan 7.4 14.7 
Tanzania 35.3 20.9 
Uganda 10.5 27.7 
Zimbabwe 5.9 16.0 
Africa 12.1 12.6 
Eastern Africa, N.S. 16.7 5.9 
Western Africa, N.S. 16.4 14.0 
Other Africa, N.S. 17.6 11.2 
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Australia 15.0 13.6 
Fiji 14.3 8.0 
Micronesia 0.0 2.5 
New Zealand 27.5 22.4 
Tonga 22.7 10.7 
Samoa 0.0 0.0 
Other US Island Areas, N.S. 18.8 17.3 
Note: Unweighted results. 
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Table 3: Self-employment rates by arrival cohorts 
 2003 2013 
Natives 14.3 12.0 
Immigrants 13.2 13.2 
   
2010-13 Arrivals  6.1 
2005-09 Arrivals  8.6 
2000-04 Arrivals 6.0 11.6 
1995-99 Arrivals 7.6 12.8 
1990-94 Arrivals 12.0 14.3 
1985-89 Arrivals 14.6 15.3 
1980-84 Arrivals 15.9 16.7 
1975-79 Arrivals 17.5 16.2 
Pre-1975 Arrivals 19.0 17.1 
Note: Unweighted results. 
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Table 4: Education attainment by country of origin 
   2003 2013 
 
Countries 
Less than high 
school 
More than 
College 
Less than high 
school 
More than 
College 
Albania 18.9 21.6 6.6 39.2 
Austria 3.3 45.9 3.9 53.9 
Belgium 4.2 62.5 2.7 73.3 
Bulgaria 6.3 62.5 2.8 59.4 
Czechoslovakia 4.8 57.1 3.4 55.2 
Denmark 4.8 52.4 3.0 62.1 
Finland 0.0 56.0 5.0 67.5 
France 3.8 63.5 3.3 70.7 
Germany 4.6 53.9 2.9 60.4 
Greece 26.7 31.1 14.8 41.9 
Hungary 6.7 46.7 6.9 48.1 
Iceland 0.0 50.0 0.0 60.0 
Ireland 10.7 35.2 4.7 47.8 
Italy 22.3 26.2 13.9 38.9 
Netherlands 4.8 56.8 2.6 64.5 
Norway 0.0 61.9 0.0 76.4 
Poland 8.8 31.5 7.8 30.7 
Portugal 36.9 11.9 34.9 12.9 
Azores Islands 60.0 16.0 41.5 4.9 
Romania 8.7 40.9 7.6 47.5 
Spain 9.8 59.0 9.2 63.6 
Sweden 0.0 76.6 1.3 77.5 
Switzerland 2.3 79.1 1.8 66.7 
United Kingdom 5.7 58.0 2.3 61.0 
Yugoslavia 11.0 22.0 6.4 30.9 
Czech Republic 11.1 63.0 1.8 55.4 
Slovakia 0.0 31.3 0.0 47.5 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 17.4 9.1 8.6 18.2 
Croatia 4.1 30.6 4.5 44.9 
Macedonia 20.0 13.3 15.7 35.3 
Serbia 15.8 26.3 8.0 47.7 
Latvia 0.0 78.6 0.0 60.0 
Lithuania 0.0 58.3 0.0 50.0 
Armenia 13.5 40.4 5.4 39.5 
Azerbaijan 0.0 33.3 1.9 55.8 
Belarus 5.6 55.6 4.0 57.3 
Georgia 16.7 50.0 4.8 69.0 
Moldova 0.0 53.8 8.4 48.2 
Russia 4.7 66.5 3.6 65.8 
Ukraine 4.5 49.8 5.1 50.6 
USSR 0.0 82.5 0.9 75.2 
Other Europe, N.S. 8.8 50.0 9.8 34.6 
Afghanistan 10.9 41.8 17.5 30.8 
Bangladesh 11.8 53.9 9.1 59.0 
Myanmar 9.3 62.8 43.5 31.8 
Cambodia 28.3 19.2 33.0 25.5 
China 18.3 57.6 17.5 56.7 
Cyprus 15.4 53.8 4.3 65.2 
Hong Kong 7.8 60.1 9.2 62.6 
India 4.6 81.7 3.3 84.7 
Indonesia 1.2 64.6 3.0 60.0 
Iran 3.3 71.3 2.5 68.2 
Iraq 17.7 29.2 21.1 34.6 
Israel 6.3 57.7 6.2 50.8 
Japan 3.0 69.3 2.3 68.1 
Jordan 16.4 43.6 5.2 57.0 
Korea 4.3 63.0 2.4 63.7 
Kuwait 8.0 44.0 4.5 67.2 
Laos 28.7 16.3 24.7 20.2 
Lebanon 8.2 54.4 9.5 51.9 
Malaysia 7.1 71.4 9.2 72.5 
Nepal 10.5 73.7 9.3 63.4 
Pakistan 8.0 61.4 9.4 61.8 
Philippines 7.2 45.1 4.5 47.5 
Saudi Arabia 0.0 90.0 1.5 57.4 
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Singapore 18.2 63.6 3.4 71.2 
Sri Lanka 9.3 60.5 5.6 58.5 
Syria 17.7 53.2 18.3 41.4 
Taiwan 2.3 78.1 3.1 79.6 
Thailand 12.6 35.9 10.8 42.5 
Turkey 7.1 59.6 7.3 62.7 
Uzbekistan 0.0 71.4 12.7 55.1 
Vietnam 23.4 29.6 23.6 32.5 
Yemen 25.0 20.8 39.2 15.7 
Asia 13.2 42.1 13.4 43.8 
Other Asia, N.S. 0.0 61.5 29.0 35.7 
Bermuda 0.0 100.0 0.0 25.0 
Canada 7.2 48.1 3.8 59.1 
Mexico 62.2 4.9 56.2 5.5 
Belize 38.9 0.0 11.2 27.0 
Costa Rica 31.4 15.7 17.5 25.0 
El Salvador 53.5 6.9 52.0 6.8 
Guatemala 61.7 5.8 60.1 6.8 
Honduras 47.6 8.8 52.1 8.1 
Nicaragua 28.2 17.8 24.2 19.4 
Panama 13.0 41.3 8.6 32.7 
Antigua & Barbuda 0.0 50.0 7.1 32.1 
Bahamas 5.3 47.4 6.1 36.4 
Barbados 25.0 15.0 11.5 25.3 
Cuba 17.0 29.6 14.8 27.9 
Dominica 26.7 26.7 14.5 23.6 
Dominican Republic 39.9 12.2 29.8 14.8 
Grenada 11.5 42.3 10.8 21.5 
Haiti 23.5 20.9 18.5 22.3 
Jamaica 19.0 23.7 15.1 23.6 
St. Vincent & the Grenadines 0.0 33.3 23.3 9.3 
Trinidad & Tobago 15.4 25.9 9.8 23.9 
West Indies 12.5 21.9 16.1 23.2 
Caribbean, N.S. 11.8 17.6 19.0 30.2 
Argentina 15.7 36.0 10.4 39.2 
Bolivia 14.6 31.3 5.0 37.5 
Brazil 10.7 34.4 12.1 36.9 
Chile 15.6 41.6 7.5 42.9 
Colombia 15.6 33.3 10.2 35.3 
Ecuador 27.5 18.7 32.4 16.4 
Guyana 15.3 18.9 17.7 24.1 
Paraguay 25.0 25.0 16.7 22.2 
Peru 8.6 29.9 10.2 32.0 
Uruguay 20.5 20.5 15.7 24.0 
Venezuela 9.2 43.9 5.9 56.1 
South America 0.0 28.6 21.7 17.4 
Americas, N.S. 7.1 14.3 25.0 17.2 
Algeria 7.1 57.1 5.7 57.1 
Cameroon 0.0 92.3 2.6 57.9 
Cape Verde 30.8 15.4 32.8 17.2 
Egypt 5.6 72.7 2.6 69.0 
Ethiopia 9.2 48.7 6.2 38.2 
Eritrea 14.3 28.6 23.7 39.5 
Ghana 5.7 38.6 7.0 41.6 
Kenya 0.0 62.8 2.4 59.9 
Liberia 4.2 52.1 10.0 30.9 
Libya 0.0 85.7 0.0 82.4 
Morocco 13.5 42.3 10.7 43.1 
Nigeria 2.6 68.7 1.8 68.8 
Sierra Leone 0.0 40.9 7.8 32.8 
Somalia 44.4 22.2 28.0 16.8 
South Africa 2.3 73.6 3.4 67.4 
Sudan 11.1 33.3 14.7 36.0 
Tanzania 0.0 70.6 11.6 74.4 
Uganda 5.3 73.7 2.1 61.7 
Zimbabwe 0.0 70.6 4.0 60.0 
Africa 5.5 31.9 13.1 28.6 
Eastern Africa, N.S. 16.7 66.7 11.8 51.5 
Western Africa, N.S. 20.0 43.6 18.0 40.0 
Other Africa, N.S. 8.8 61.8 12.8 40.4 
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Australia 4.7 69.2 8.0 61.6 
Fiji 31.0 11.9 18.4 19.5 
Micronesia 40.0 0.0 25.0 7.5 
New Zealand 5.0 50.0 2.0 54.1 
Tonga 18.2 18.2 17.9 7.1 
Samoa 30.0 10.0 20.0 5.0 
Other US Island Areas, N.S. 37.5 18.8 19.2 15.4 
Note: Unweighted results. 
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Table 5: Education attainment and English proficiency by arrival cohorts  
 2003 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Less than high 
school 
More than 
College 
Years of 
schooling 
Limited English 
Natives 8.0 31.8 13.4 N/A 
Immigrants 29.8 31.8 11.7 0.28 
     
2000-04 Arrivals 35.0 32.5 11.3 0.50 
1995-99 Arrivals 33.7 31.8 11.6 0.40 
1990-94 Arrivals 30.2 31.1 11.6 0.30 
1985-89 Arrivals 33.0 27.0 11.4 0.27 
1980-84 Arrivals 30.3 29.3 11.6 0.22 
1975-79 Arrivals 27.4 34.9 11.9 0.17 
Pre-1975 Arrivals 20.1 36.5 12.4 0.10 
 
 2013 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Less than high 
school 
More than 
College 
Years of 
schooling 
Limited English 
Natives 6.4 33.5 13.8 N/A 
Immigrants 28.2 32.5 12.4 0.25 
     
2010-13 Arrivals 22.2 47.7 13.3 0.33 
2005-09 Arrivals 28.8 35.8 12.4 0.36 
2000-04 Arrivals 30.3 30.1 12.2 0.32 
1995-99 Arrivals 29.3 31.7 12.3 0.26 
1990-94 Arrivals 29.2 29.6 12.0 0.23 
1985-89 Arrivals 30.9 28.7 12.2 0.22 
1980-84 Arrivals 28.8 30.7 12.4 0.19 
1975-79 Arrivals 27.4 33.9 12.4 0.16 
Pre-1975 Arrivals 19.4 33.8 13.0 0.10 
Note: Unweighted results. 
 
  
 45 
Table 6: Mean of wage/salary earnings and self-employment earnings by arrival cohorts 
 2003 2013 
     
 Wage/salary Self- 
employment 
Wage/salary Self- 
employment 
Natives 64,515 43,273 63,065 41,445 
Immigrants 56,382 45,045 56,817 36,065 
     
2010-13 Arrivals   50,204 22,533 
2005-09 Arrivals   47,389 24,711 
2000-04 Arrivals 42,221 30,575 48,484 27,914 
1995-99 Arrivals 47,826 37,939 55,800 33,248 
1990-94 Arrivals 51,943 41,034 56,956 36,670 
1985-89 Arrivals 52,059 39,818 57,945 37,304 
1980-84 Arrivals 57,270 45,410 62,895 43,060 
1975-79 Arrivals 67,972 45,047 72,513 44,849 
Pre-1975 Arrivals 76,488 58,291 74,194 48,596 
Note: The values are adjusted to 2013 dollars using the Consumer Price Index by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Unweighted results. 
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Table 7: Regression results for the Heckman first stage (probit) model to 
estimate the probability of being a wage earner, based on 2003 and 2013 
ACS PUMS data 
   
 
Variables 
Marginal effect Standard errors 
Immigrant -0.0807*** (0.021) 
General Characteristics   
Age -0.0103*** (0.001) 
Age squared 0.0001*** (0.000) 
Age*immigrant 0.0024** (0.001) 
Age squared*immigrant -0.0000 (0.000) 
Years of schooling -0.0009*** (0.000) 
Years of schooling*immigrant 0.0025*** (0.000) 
Limited English 0.0075*** (0.003) 
Married -0.0144*** (0.002) 
Black 0.0797*** (0.004) 
Hispanic 0.0477*** (0.004) 
Asian 0.0409*** (0.006) 
Other race 0.0378*** (0.005) 
Length of residency -0.0067*** (0.001) 
Length of residency squared 0.0001*** (0.000) 
Period effect (2003) -0.0238*** (0.002) 
Arrival Cohorts   
  2005-09 Arrivals -0.0145** (0.007) 
  2000-04 Arrivals -0.0089 (0.007) 
  1995-99 Arrivals 0.0050 (0.008) 
  1990-94 Arrivals 0.0127 (0.009) 
  1985-89 Arrivals 0.0207** (0.010) 
  1980-84 Arrivals 0.0299*** (0.010) 
  1975-79 Arrivals 0.0474*** (0.011) 
  Pre-1975 Arrivals 0.0511*** (0.012) 
Country of Origin   
Albania -0.0178 (0.026) 
Austria -0.0808** (0.032) 
Belgium -0.0426 (0.037) 
Bulgaria -0.0534** (0.023) 
Czechoslovakia -0.0573 (0.049) 
Denmark -0.0236 (0.037) 
Finland -0.1130** (0.044) 
France 0.0053 (0.014) 
Germany 0.0207** (0.010) 
Greece -0.0959*** (0.014) 
Hungary -0.0442* (0.024) 
Iceland -0.1866* (0.105) 
Ireland -0.0567*** (0.015) 
Italy -0.0156 (0.011) 
Netherlands -0.0284 (0.019) 
Norway -0.0662 (0.047) 
Poland -0.0232** (0.010) 
Portugal 0.0423*** (0.014) 
Azores Islands -0.0099 (0.041) 
Romania -0.0362*** (0.014) 
Spain -0.0365* (0.021) 
Sweden 0.0008 (0.033) 
Switzerland -0.0552** (0.028) 
United Kingdom 0.0179** (0.008) 
Yugoslavia -0.0492** (0.024) 
Czech Republic -0.1131*** (0.038) 
Slovakia -0.1918*** (0.051) 
Bosnia and Herzegovina -0.0081 (0.020) 
Croatia -0.0488 (0.032) 
Macedonia -0.0741 (0.046) 
Serbia -0.0531 (0.040) 
Latvia -0.0996* (0.058) 
Lithuania -0.1480*** (0.032) 
Armenia -0.0624*** (0.020) 
Azerbaijan -0.0648 (0.045) 
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Belarus -0.0520* (0.029) 
Georgia -0.1247** (0.051) 
Moldova -0.0585 (0.036) 
Russia -0.0210* (0.012) 
Ukraine -0.0243** (0.012) 
USSR -0.0148 (0.030) 
Other Europe, N.S. -0.0480* (0.026) 
Afghanistan -0.0891*** (0.022) 
Bangladesh -0.0450*** (0.015) 
Myanmar 0.0547* (0.029) 
Cambodia -0.0090 (0.019) 
China 0.0038 (0.010) 
Cyprus -0.0783 (0.074) 
Hong Kong 0.0280** (0.014) 
India 0.0046 (0.009) 
Indonesia 0.0380 (0.025) 
Iran -0.0705*** (0.010) 
Iraq -0.0506*** (0.016) 
Israel -0.1065*** (0.014) 
Japan -0.0266** (0.013) 
Jordan -0.1004*** (0.020) 
Korea -0.1035*** (0.010) 
Kuwait -0.0355 (0.038) 
Laos 0.0524*** (0.018) 
Lebanon -0.0526*** (0.014) 
Malaysia 0.0378 (0.027) 
Nepal 0.0312 (0.041) 
Pakistan -0.0678*** (0.012) 
Philippines 0.1035*** (0.010) 
Saudi Arabia -0.1162 (0.076) 
Singapore -0.0115 (0.051) 
Sri Lanka 0.0272 (0.031) 
Syria -0.0820*** (0.020) 
Taiwan -0.0105 (0.012) 
Thailand -0.0056 (0.018) 
Turkey -0.0396** (0.017) 
Uzbekistan -0.0513* (0.030) 
Vietnam 0.0128 (0.010) 
Yemen -0.0132 (0.033) 
Asia -0.1317*** (0.031) 
Other Asia, N.S. -0.0136 (0.027) 
Bermuda -0.0557 (0.103) 
Mexico 0.0395*** (0.008) 
Belize 0.0044 (0.037) 
Costa Rica -0.0667*** (0.021) 
El Salvador 0.0244*** (0.009) 
Guatemala -0.0120 (0.009) 
Honduras -0.0161 (0.012) 
Nicaragua 0.0287* (0.015) 
Panama 0.0316 (0.027) 
Antigua & Barbuda 0.0963 (0.096) 
Bahamas 0.0095 (0.044) 
Barbados 0.0910* (0.053) 
Cuba -0.0339*** (0.009) 
Dominica -0.0285 (0.046) 
Dominican Republic 0.0063 (0.011) 
Grenada 0.0085 (0.044) 
Haiti 0.0453*** (0.013) 
Jamaica -0.0087 (0.011) 
St. Vincent & the Grenadines -0.0424 (0.055) 
Trinidad & Tobago 0.0043 (0.016) 
West Indies -0.0260 (0.042) 
Caribbean, N.S. -0.0059 (0.045) 
Argentina -0.0807*** (0.014) 
Bolivia -0.0105 (0.025) 
Brazil -0.0687*** (0.011) 
Chile -0.0625*** (0.019) 
Colombia -0.0340*** (0.010) 
Ecuador 0.0053 (0.012) 
Guyana 0.0260* (0.014) 
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Paraguay -0.1101* (0.056) 
Peru -0.0232** (0.011) 
Uruguay -0.1260*** (0.024) 
Venezuela -0.0642*** (0.015) 
South America -0.0853 (0.057) 
Americas, N.S. -0.0111 (0.048) 
Algeria -0.0751* (0.044) 
Cameroon -0.0169 (0.047) 
Cape Verde 0.0701 (0.074) 
Egypt -0.0125 (0.014) 
Ethiopia -0.1009*** (0.017) 
Eritrea -0.1428*** (0.040) 
Ghana -0.0189 (0.021) 
Kenya 0.0105 (0.030) 
Liberia 0.0120 (0.046) 
Libya -0.1414 (0.180) 
Morocco -0.0851*** (0.022) 
Nigeria -0.0431*** (0.016) 
Sierra Leone -0.0739 (0.046) 
Somalia -0.0728* (0.039) 
South Africa 0.0043 (0.018) 
Sudan -0.1325*** (0.051) 
Tanzania -0.1397*** (0.050) 
Uganda -0.1719*** (0.047) 
Zimbabwe -0.0681 (0.050) 
Africa -0.0853*** (0.024) 
Eastern Africa, N.S. -0.0625 (0.069) 
Western Africa, N.S. -0.1842*** (0.034) 
Other Africa, N.S. -0.0331* (0.020) 
Australia -0.0025 (0.020) 
Fiji 0.0316 (0.032) 
Micronesia 0.1002 (0.106) 
New Zealand -0.0867*** (0.031) 
Tonga -0.0387 (0.045) 
Other US Island Areas, N.S. -0.1799*** (0.053) 
Enclave effect and Earnings Differential 
  Proportion of immigrants from the same country   of the total 
population by state and year 
-0.0021*** (0.000) 
  Ratio of self-employment earnings to wage/salary   earnings (by 
state, year, and country of origin for immigrants; by state, year, and 
ethnicity for natives) 
-0.0072*** (0.001) 
Observations 267,686  
Note: Unweighted results. Samoa was omitted because of collinearity. The values in the table represent the 
marginal effect of each independent variable. All models include state dummy variables. 
*Statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
**Statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
***Statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 8: Regression results for annual logged wage, based on 2003 and 2013 ACS PUMS data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
OLS 
Standard 
Errors 
Heckman  
OLS 
Standard 
Errors Variables 
Immigrant 1.9722*** (0.048) 2.0882*** (0.079) 
General Characteristics     
Age 0.1299*** (0.001) 0.1409*** (0.002) 
Age squared -0.0014*** (0.000) -0.0014*** (0.000) 
Age*immigrant -0.0518*** (0.002) -0.0534*** (0.003) 
Age squared*immigrant 0.0005*** (0.000) 0.0005*** (0.000) 
Years of schooling 0.1006*** (0.001) 0.1024*** (0.001) 
Years of schooling*immigrant -0.0518*** (0.001) -0.0569*** (0.002) 
Limited English -0.2255*** (0.007) -0.2375*** (0.011) 
Married 0.2827*** (0.004) 0.3103*** (0.007) 
Black -0.3565*** (0.008) -0.4965*** (0.020) 
Hispanic -0.1796*** (0.009) -0.2676*** (0.017) 
Asian -0.0211 (0.015) -0.1021*** (0.026) 
Other race -0.2113*** (0.012) -0.2871*** (0.021) 
Length of residency 0.0181*** (0.001) 0.0315*** (0.002) 
Length of residency squared -0.0002*** (0.000) -0.0004*** (0.000) 
Period effect (2003) 0.1164*** (0.005) 0.1670*** (0.009) 
Arrival Cohorts     
  2005-09 Arrivals 0.1606*** (0.014) 0.1736*** (0.023) 
  2000-04 Arrivals 0.0945*** (0.015) 0.0943*** (0.024) 
  1995-99 Arrivals 0.1258*** (0.017) 0.0984*** (0.028) 
  1990-94 Arrivals 0.0996*** (0.020) 0.0589* (0.033) 
  1985-89 Arrivals 0.0862*** (0.022) 0.0319 (0.037) 
  1980-84 Arrivals 0.1099*** (0.025) 0.0411 (0.041) 
  1975-79 Arrivals 0.1829*** (0.027) 0.0774* (0.045) 
  Pre-1975 Arrivals 0.1530*** (0.031) 0.0447 (0.050) 
Country of Origin     
Albania -0.5390*** (0.073) -0.5000*** (0.116) 
Austria -0.1598 (0.109) 0.0655 (0.166) 
Belgium 0.0419 (0.114) 0.1426 (0.177) 
Bulgaria -0.2139*** (0.072) -0.0825 (0.112) 
Czechoslovakia -0.2962* (0.169) -0.1191 (0.256) 
Denmark 0.3281*** (0.115) 0.3981** (0.178) 
Finland 0.1086 (0.169) 0.4633* (0.251) 
France 0.0092 (0.039) -0.0138 (0.063) 
Germany -0.1182*** (0.028) -0.1690*** (0.044) 
Greece -0.3678*** (0.050) -0.0718 (0.081) 
Hungary -0.2856*** (0.078) -0.1644 (0.120) 
Iceland 0.3236 (0.455) 0.9345 (0.637) 
Ireland -0.0737 (0.047) 0.0778 (0.074) 
Italy -0.3071*** (0.033) -0.2574*** (0.051) 
Netherlands -0.0702 (0.060) 0.0043 (0.093) 
Norway 0.1384 (0.165) 0.3505 (0.250) 
Poland -0.3770*** (0.029) -0.3202*** (0.045) 
Portugal -0.3940*** (0.039) -0.4820*** (0.062) 
Azores Islands -0.4296*** (0.126) -0.3866** (0.196) 
Romania -0.3425*** (0.043) -0.2514*** (0.068) 
Spain 0.0251 (0.057) 0.0872 (0.091) 
Sweden 0.1944** (0.094) 0.1923 (0.149) 
Switzerland 0.1940** (0.091) 0.3340** (0.141) 
United Kingdom 0.0731*** (0.023) 0.0284 (0.037) 
Yugoslavia -0.4333*** (0.079) -0.2995** (0.123) 
Czech Republic -0.2415* (0.145) 0.1188 (0.216) 
Slovakia -0.5011** (0.211) 0.0825 (0.308) 
Bosnia and Herzegovina -0.5619*** (0.058) -0.5298*** (0.091) 
Croatia -0.2512** (0.101) -0.1328 (0.157) 
Macedonia -0.1333 (0.155) 0.0547 (0.238) 
Serbia -0.4353*** (0.121) -0.3193* (0.190) 
Latvia -0.0762 (0.211) 0.2081 (0.316) 
Lithuania -0.2485** (0.121) 0.1948 (0.183) 
Armenia -0.8085*** (0.068) -0.6313*** (0.106) 
Azerbaijan -0.4872*** (0.153) -0.3092 (0.233) 
Belarus -0.3057*** (0.090) -0.1787 (0.140) 
Georgia -0.4334** (0.187) -0.0957 (0.281) 
Moldova -0.3261*** (0.115) -0.1755 (0.178) 
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Russia -0.2712*** (0.034) -0.2227*** (0.054) 
Ukraine -0.3239*** (0.034) -0.2711*** (0.054) 
USSR -0.1523* (0.090) -0.1234 (0.141) 
Other Europe, N.S. -0.2959*** (0.083) -0.1671 (0.130) 
Afghanistan -0.4517*** (0.075) -0.2042* (0.117) 
Bangladesh -0.6753*** (0.042) -0.5870*** (0.068) 
Myanmar -0.3759*** (0.065) -0.4795*** (0.106) 
Cambodia -0.4915*** (0.053) -0.4768*** (0.084) 
China -0.3826*** (0.025) -0.3985*** (0.040) 
Cyprus 0.1083 (0.263) 0.3459 (0.397) 
Hong Kong -0.2300*** (0.035) -0.3055*** (0.057) 
India -0.0013 (0.023) -0.0183 (0.037) 
Indonesia -0.4429*** (0.059) -0.5362*** (0.096) 
Iran -0.2430*** (0.032) -0.0381 (0.054) 
Iraq -0.7794*** (0.050) -0.6560*** (0.079) 
Israel -0.1855*** (0.049) 0.1281 (0.081) 
Japan 0.0434 (0.035) 0.0855 (0.056) 
Jordan -0.4658*** (0.073) -0.1635 (0.114) 
Korea -0.4419*** (0.028) -0.1886*** (0.051) 
Kuwait -0.5335*** (0.115) -0.4496** (0.180) 
Laos -0.6167*** (0.043) -0.7392*** (0.071) 
Lebanon -0.2649*** (0.046) -0.1124 (0.072) 
Malaysia -0.1507** (0.066) -0.2321** (0.107) 
Nepal -0.6193*** (0.088) -0.6806*** (0.143) 
Pakistan -0.5094*** (0.034) -0.3566*** (0.055) 
Philippines -0.5883*** (0.024) -0.7764*** (0.043) 
Saudi Arabia -0.3806 (0.250) -0.1180 (0.384) 
Singapore 0.0380 (0.135) 0.0464 (0.215) 
Sri Lanka -0.2396*** (0.075) -0.3114*** (0.121) 
Syria -0.4349*** (0.069) -0.1815* (0.107) 
Taiwan -0.1171*** (0.032) -0.1114** (0.051) 
Thailand -0.5748*** (0.047) -0.5780*** (0.075) 
Turkey -0.2467*** (0.051) -0.1521* (0.080) 
Uzbekistan -0.5990*** (0.090) -0.4795*** (0.141) 
Vietnam -0.5242*** (0.025) -0.5623*** (0.040) 
Yemen -0.9114*** (0.095) -0.8750*** (0.150) 
Asia -0.6482*** (0.113) -0.2817 (0.171) 
Other Asia, N.S. -0.5717*** (0.069) -0.5497*** (0.111) 
Bermuda -0.6590* (0.353) -0.4954 (0.536) 
Mexico -0.5037*** (0.019) -0.5669*** (0.031) 
Belize -0.3457*** (0.093) -0.3870*** (0.150) 
Costa Rica -0.3842*** (0.062) -0.2555*** (0.098) 
El Salvador -0.4743*** (0.023) -0.5348*** (0.037) 
Guatemala -0.4739*** (0.024) -0.4682*** (0.039) 
Honduras -0.4618*** (0.030) -0.4489*** (0.048) 
Nicaragua -0.4580*** (0.038) -0.5403*** (0.061) 
Panama -0.2936*** (0.065) -0.3776*** (0.106) 
Antigua & Barbuda -0.1532 (0.177) -0.3454 (0.293) 
Bahamas -0.2617** (0.108) -0.3112* (0.174) 
Barbados -0.1758* (0.099) -0.3640** (0.164) 
Cuba -0.3547*** (0.025) -0.2759*** (0.041) 
Dominica -0.4069*** (0.123) -0.3753* (0.196) 
Dominican Republic -0.5480*** (0.027) -0.5729*** (0.043) 
Grenada -0.3546*** (0.103) -0.4026** (0.168) 
Haiti -0.4116*** (0.030) -0.5159*** (0.049) 
Jamaica -0.2907*** (0.028) -0.3018*** (0.045) 
St. Vincent & the Grenadines -0.2837* (0.145) -0.2309 (0.232) 
Trinidad & Tobago -0.2791*** (0.040) -0.3133*** (0.064) 
West Indies -0.3193*** (0.110) -0.3007* (0.176) 
Caribbean, N.S. -0.2325** (0.116) -0.2509 (0.186) 
Argentina -0.1210*** (0.042) 0.0619 (0.068) 
Bolivia -0.4973*** (0.066) -0.4969*** (0.105) 
Brazil -0.2919*** (0.033) -0.1227** (0.055) 
Chile -0.3600*** (0.058) -0.2296** (0.092) 
Colombia -0.3618*** (0.028) -0.3048*** (0.045) 
Ecuador -0.4549*** (0.031) -0.4840*** (0.049) 
Guyana -0.3556*** (0.035) -0.4230*** (0.057) 
Paraguay -0.7341*** (0.192) -0.4528 (0.294) 
Peru -0.4909*** (0.031) -0.4602*** (0.049) 
Uruguay -0.2806*** (0.083) 0.0340 (0.130) 
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Venezuela -0.2093*** (0.044) -0.0805 (0.070) 
South America -0.6384*** (0.187) -0.4320 (0.287) 
Americas, N.S. -0.3607*** (0.124) -0.3576* (0.199) 
Algeria -0.0758 (0.153) 0.1295 (0.232) 
Cameroon -0.2484** (0.107) -0.2400 (0.174) 
Cape Verde -0.3904** (0.154) -0.5300** (0.252) 
Egypt -0.5255*** (0.040) -0.4978*** (0.064) 
Ethiopia -0.4194*** (0.049) -0.2214*** (0.079) 
Eritrea -0.2716** (0.131) 0.0365 (0.203) 
Ghana -0.2635*** (0.049) -0.2455*** (0.079) 
Kenya -0.1202* (0.070) -0.1550 (0.113) 
Liberia -0.5616*** (0.108) -0.5516*** (0.175) 
Libya 0.0834 (0.788) 0.6021 (1.096) 
Morocco -0.5756*** (0.074) -0.3533*** (0.115) 
Nigeria -0.2720*** (0.041) -0.2155*** (0.065) 
Sierra Leone -0.3116** (0.136) -0.1627 (0.215) 
Somalia -0.6821*** (0.107) -0.5448*** (0.171) 
South Africa 0.1571*** (0.051) 0.1395* (0.080) 
Sudan -1.0189*** (0.165) -0.7338*** (0.255) 
Tanzania -0.2901 (0.182) 0.0886 (0.273) 
Uganda -0.2107 (0.177) 0.2427 (0.266) 
Zimbabwe -0.0209 (0.159) 0.1334 (0.246) 
Africa -0.3015*** (0.071) -0.1439 (0.113) 
Eastern Africa, N.S. 0.0315 (0.204) 0.1433 (0.320) 
Western Africa, N.S. -0.6072*** (0.122) -0.1684 (0.188) 
Other Africa, N.S. -0.4196*** (0.052) -0.3732*** (0.083) 
Australia 0.1675*** (0.055) 0.1616* (0.087) 
Fiji -0.3627*** (0.082) -0.4439*** (0.131) 
Micronesia -1.0648*** (0.213) -1.2461*** (0.349) 
New Zealand 0.2350** (0.105) 0.4739*** (0.161) 
Tonga -0.7083*** (0.135) -0.6318*** (0.212) 
Samoa -1.2412*** (0.456) -1.6427** (0.766) 
Other US Island Areas, N.S. -0.9075*** (0.205) -0.4278 (0.303) 
Correction term   -1.3219*** (0.137) 
Constant 6.1755*** (0.033) 6.0248*** (0.056) 
     
Observations 232,682  232,682  
R-squared 0.314    
Note: Unweighted results. Both models include state dummy variables. 
*Statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
**Statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
***Statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 9: Descriptive statistics for wages and self-employment earnings 
Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Immigrants 
Wages 120,031 56714.2 66880.5 4.030196 674872.9 
Self-emp. earnings 13,614 38165.8 58707.0 -12829 416117.8 
Natives 
Wages 136,618 63490.6 66185.4 4.030196 674872.9 
Self-emp. earnings 17,110 42066.9 66054.5 -12829 462465 
Note: Unweighted results. The values are adjusted to 2013 dollars using the Consumer Price Index by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Mean of Annual wage and self-employment earnings by country of origin 
 2003 2013 
Country Wage/salary  Self-employment  Wage/salary  Self-employment 
Albania 44,215 13,857 46,348 50,649 
Austria 96,843 68,642 85,186 66,209 
Belgium 85,668 91,095 128,140 42,656 
Bulgaria 96,369 32,076 70,459 30,524 
Czechoslovakia 129,707 29,730 82,031 80,782 
Denmark 97,474 61,040 139,287 77,178 
Finland 78,293 68,984 116,117 5,105 
France 111,639 47,039 102,910 29,250 
Germany 85,848 38,266 98,912 47,699 
Greece 76,836 48,443 81,010 50,161 
Hungary 93,789 95,233 80,742 64,944 
Iceland 113,548 . 135,861 29,471 
Ireland 85,894 62,829 111,643 68,868 
Italy 80,668 60,687 78,848 63,978 
Netherlands 104,941 34,946 106,948 70,102 
Norway 111,457 59,821 126,796 62,720 
Poland 63,675 40,660 62,672 35,915 
Portugal 57,783 49,623 61,088 41,372 
Azores Islands 64,846 41,057 46,837 34,617 
Romania 67,341 30,845 76,798 48,925 
Spain 93,849 43,256 92,173 59,644 
Sweden 109,673 26,815 123,068 53,189 
Switzerland 149,364 73,902 145,150 25,657 
United Kingdom 115,793 49,429 118,908 46,834 
Yugoslavia 75,443 27,567 69,823 50,613 
Czech Republic 75,627 51,193 82,030 49,928 
Slovakia 62,494 51,642 73,969 29,823 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 37,726 28,869 44,766 58,361 
Croatia 51,578 52,789 81,292 21,118 
Macedonia 46,408 35,861 73,651 19,446 
Serbia 58,371 12,830 62,869 28,911 
Latvia 116,627 61,489 99,452 32,913 
Lithuania 71,109 21,811 70,356 57,974 
Armenia 45,295 53,218 56,060 44,592 
Azerbaijan 45,761 . 64,899 20,258 
Belarus 54,899 30,985 72,469 26,911 
Georgia 63,039 . 74,898 29,345 
Moldova 58,624 19,053 69,028 28,875 
Russia 74,560 44,333 77,642 42,332 
Ukraine 60,761 32,575 70,091 36,669 
USSR 83,872 33,617 90,306 22,088 
Other Europe, N.S. 86,330 94,354 71,347 56,090 
Afghanistan 49,612 59,987 57,503 37,527 
Bangladesh 49,614 28,218 55,548 26,039 
Myanmar 74,380 20,605 46,843 88,229 
Cambodia 47,153 54,090 48,267 52,594 
China 68,727 54,620 69,845 44,685 
Cyprus 88,422 26,944 75,586 31,234 
Hong Kong 88,425 60,376 87,683 40,642 
India 92,474 51,236 101,597 56,486 
Indonesia 60,625 48,755 66,288 20,241 
Iran 89,654 63,462 104,108 59,813 
Iraq 56,009 49,327 45,947 29,708 
Israel 112,322 49,945 98,916 51,283 
Japan 103,958 52,399 95,280 45,010 
Jordan 63,317 37,500 75,299 67,672 
Korea 69,246 56,936 73,203 41,980 
Kuwait 39,998 18,869 82,952 33,048 
Laos 39,184 29,792 44,614 28,272 
Lebanon 89,516 58,684 93,571 54,612 
Malaysia 67,446 65,114 95,991 79,623 
Nepal 58,857 . 52,642 30,083 
Pakistan 67,072 66,561 75,437 41,546 
Philippines 52,869 53,861 55,604 29,975 
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Saudi Arabia 78,051 91,416 64,297 13,400 
Singapore 99,198 82,541 91,713 22,368 
Sri Lanka 76,960 59,875 87,658 38,331 
Syria 75,582 92,926 74,315 87,175 
Taiwan 97,211 40,261 98,252 42,955 
Thailand 47,256 69,467 48,651 36,763 
Turkey 76,513 64,428 88,630 49,473 
Uzbekistan 47,697 26,999 55,916 56,342 
Vietnam 53,075 41,297 57,066 39,358 
Yemen 62,752 88,315 37,580 36,327 
Asia 117,645 44,977 58,946 28,289 
Other Asia, N.S. 77,495 85,621 44,041 38,776 
Bermuda 84,680 . 45,854 186,900 
Canada 93,036 52,848 111,366 52,036 
Mexico 31,073 32,964 31,611 26,131 
Belize 38,046 19,245 54,738 45,079 
Costa Rica 50,839 8,887 57,218 35,160 
El Salvador 35,374 34,797 33,113 27,890 
Guatemala 31,294 40,667 27,947 21,681 
Honduras 37,887 30,424 29,534 24,711 
Nicaragua 40,103 36,079 41,599 25,101 
Panama 57,631 22,068 60,189 43,136 
Antigua & Barbuda 68,770 . 57,326 -6,650 
Bahamas 58,859 29,061 61,364 15,113 
Barbados 44,459 26,687 63,269 7,053 
Cuba 59,457 43,165 49,559 28,043 
Dominica 43,743 98,152 44,623 6,088 
Dominican Republic 38,628 28,245 36,470 26,204 
Grenada 68,086 13,172 50,488 20,504 
Haiti 39,416 33,249 39,710 24,952 
Jamaica 49,106 37,173 48,554 30,062 
St. Vincent & the Grenadines 98,366 . 49,659 12,628 
Trinidad & Tobago 49,922 54,058 54,512 23,406 
West Indies 48,136 32,076 45,782 23,207 
Caribbean, N.S. 61,087 32,717 54,579 101,435 
Argentina 66,158 62,529 84,933 28,317 
Bolivia 63,324 64,665 49,715 21,869 
Brazil 52,596 34,706 70,466 32,123 
Chile 63,753 47,537 63,975 35,008 
Colombia 51,668 45,160 52,683 30,327 
Ecuador 38,957 27,613 42,348 23,218 
Guyana 48,915 76,404 54,005 23,289 
Paraguay 37,416 . 34,055 30,701 
Peru 42,532 45,678 44,974 24,629 
Uruguay 51,219 67,359 74,900 29,324 
Venezuela 64,765 28,851 66,350 33,011 
South America 46,146 39,389 34,279 10,579 
Americas, N.S. 39,306 . 51,198 16,740 
Algeria 76,291 51,321 68,153 17,560 
Cameroon 53,029 7,720 66,574 24,015 
Cape Verde 40,864 33,936 36,251 . 
Egypt 82,210 44,090 75,462 60,989 
Ethiopia 44,173 29,756 45,607 26,000 
Eritrea 47,387 24,891 45,601 37,607 
Ghana 60,519 57,656 55,909 45,946 
Kenya 83,372 24,224 75,950 46,666 
Liberia 43,619 97,082 39,646 106,624 
Libya 76,688 . 100,818 70,528 
Morocco 61,180 22,462 58,321 49,021 
Nigeria 58,265 60,834 62,834 36,040 
Sierra Leone 52,445 125,095 44,288 73,114 
Somalia 21,869 . 28,122 47,597 
South Africa 108,104 102,093 127,884 56,155 
Sudan 35,854 . 42,416 11,620 
Tanzania 136,531 33,102 89,528 77,581 
Uganda 129,123 10,906 88,512 82,115 
Zimbabwe 86,303 6,415 92,059 18,270 
Africa 44,428 36,800 44,991 26,805 
Eastern Africa, N.S. 77,382 180,907 62,379 1,965 
Western Africa, N.S. 47,909 16,200 43,032 16,201 
 55 
Other Africa, N.S. 70,376 51,482 56,628 29,336 
Australia 104,326 43,724 114,037 44,765 
Fiji 44,320 24,591 55,996 34,113 
Micronesia 31,781 . 22,809 605 
New Zealand 99,878 63,440 117,461 52,276 
Tonga 41,237 16,056 39,683 15,113 
Samoa 40,210 . 39,259 9,068 
Other US Island Areas, N.S. 35,523 230,945 27,819 15,084 
Note: The values are adjusted to 2013 dollars using the Consumer Price Index by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Zero 
values are shown as missing. 
 
 
 
